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THE LEMON TEST AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A PROPOSAL FOR 
MODIFICATION 
The separation of church and state, as contemplated by the 
First Amendment,1 has given rise to a troubling line of cases in-
terpreting the Establishment Clause.2 In 1971, the United States 
Supreme Court fashioned a test for deciding these cases in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman.s Previous Establishment Clause holdings· 
were synthesized into a three-pronged analysis. "First, the stat-
ute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.'" (citation omitted):1 An act 
which fails to satisfy any of the three prongs violates the Estab-
1. The First Amendment provides "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. These cases require a judicial assessment as to whether a particular legislation or 
ruling advances religious doctrine or institutions, thereby "respecting an establishment 
of religion." 
There is an inherent tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exer-
cise Clause. An act may pursue neutrality so aggressively under the former that free 
excercise rights under the latter are compromised. 
3. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
4. The legislative purpose and primary effect prongs of the test were derived from 
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). The government entanglement prong 
was first enunciated in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). Lemon and its 
authorities are fully discussed in.§ II, infra, notes 10-34. 
5. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613. This is the first statement by the Court of these 
three elements in a single, seemingly coherent test. The test's apparent simplicity makes 
it immediately attractive as a practical judicial tool. It will be shown, however, that this 
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lishment Clause.s 
In practical application, this test has been the source of a 
great deal of confusion,7 yielding what one writer has termed "a 
conceptual disaster area."8 This comment will show that the first 
or "purpose" prong is the source of much of the confusion. Ac-
cordingly, the purpose prong should be abandoned, as its limited 
utility is greatly outweighed by the problems it creates.9 
It LEMON V. KURTZMAN 
In Lemon, Rhode Island's Salary Supplement ActIO author-
ized a maximum fifteen percent salary supplement to teachers of 
secular subjects in non public elementary schools. The lower 
court found that approximately twenty-five percent of the 
State's pupils attend~d non-public schools; ninety-five percent 
of these schools were parochial Roman Catholic.ll As of the trial 
date, all 250 teachers who had applied for benefits under the act 
were employees of the Roman Catholic church.12 The District 
6. Edwards v. Aguillard 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 (1987)(discussed fully in § III, infra, 
notes 35-62). 
7. See § VI, infra, notes 63-87. The confusion which the Lemon test has created in 
the courts is persistent and receives recurring attention by the legal press. See, e.g., Rei-
diIlger, Trends in the Law: What is Establishment?, 75 A.B.A.J. 100 (1989); Reidinger, 
Trends in the Law: Exercised About Religion, 75 A.B.A.J. 81 (Dec. 1989). 
8. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 
Calif. L. Rev. 5,6 (1987). The author surveyed the Court's application of the Lemon test, 
and found the distinctions necessary to reconcile the inconsistencies among the opinions 
virtually imperceptible. Id. at 6,7. 
9. The suggestion that the purpose prong of the Lemon test be eliminated is not 
original. See Comment, The Lemon Test and Subjectiue Intent in Establishment 
Clause Analysis: A Case for Abandoning the Purpose Prong, 76 Ky. L.J. 1061 
(1988)(Abandoning the purpose prong would allow the Court to reach substantive ques-
tions and would "provide a more objective and consistent analysis for deciding establish-
ment clause cases." Id. at 1075); See also Comment, Balanced Treatment of Creation 
and Euolution: A Study in Reconciling the Two Religion Clauses, 34 Wayne L. Rev. 263 
(1987)(Suggesting that inquiry into legislative intent is irrelevant in that it "adds noth-
ing to the constitutional analysis since the concern of the establishment clause is 
whether a statute in fact advances or inhibits religion, not merely whether it was in-
tended to do so." Id. at 301). 
10. RI. PEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-51-1. The law made no distinction between parochial 
and non-parochial private schools, but merely provided the subsidy to any facility where 
the per-pupil expenditure was less than the public school average. 
11. Lemon 403 U.S. at 608. 
12.Id. 
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Court concluded that the Act created excessive government en-
tanglement with religion. IS 
A Pennsylvania statute,t' similar to the Rhode Island law, 
was also analyzed by the Lemon court.lII Nonpublic schools were 
reimbursed for expenditures on secular education, and were re-
quired to account separately for such expenses.1S The statistics 
were similar to those in Rhode Island: twenty percent of the 
State's pupils attended non public schools, of which ninety-six 
percent were religiously affiliated.17 
Before turning its focus to these statutes, the Supreme 
Court fashioned its test, relying heavily on two earlier opinions, 
Board of Education v. Allen18 and Walz v. Tax Commission. 19 
In Allen, the Court was asked to examine a New York statute 
which required local authorities to lend textbooks free of charge 
to all students in grades seven through twelve, including those in 
private schools.20 The Court found nothing in the record re-
vealing a legislative intent to advance or prohibit religion, and 
the effects of the statute were consistent with its stated secular 
purpose.21 The "purpose and primary effect"22 focus in Allen be-
13. [d. at 609. The law required the Commissioner of Education to review the finan-
cial data submitted 'by schools whose teachers applied for the subsidy. The Commis-
sioner would then determine if the expenditures fell below the public school average, and 
if not, what percentage of the expenditures went to secular education. Because all of the 
recipients to date were Roman Catholic teachers, this scrutiny amounted to excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion. 
14. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24 § 5601-5608 (Supp. 1971). The principle difference from 
the Rhode Island statute is that under the Pennsylvania law, private schools were reim-
bursed for expenditures on secular subjects, whereas Rhode Island subsidized the sala-
ries of teachers of secular subjects. In Pennsylvania a teacher's salary could be partially 
subsidized proportional to the secular content of the curriculum; in Rhode Island any 
religious content would render a teacher ineligible for the subsidy. 
15. 403 U.S. at 609-611. 
16. [d. at 610. 
17. Of the religiously affiliated schools, the majority were Roman Catholic. [d. 
18. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
19. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
20. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 701 (1967 Supp.) The statute authorized the loan of textbooks 
for use in secular subjects only. The selection of these textbooks was subject to the ap-
proval of the public school authorities. No religious textbooks were loaned. 
21. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243. Although the Allen court passed on purpose and effect 
separately, purpose was given cursory treatment. The Court was willing to accept the 
legislature's express purpose because it was consistent with the act's effect. Thus, the 
Allen court paved the way for later decisions which would either accept a mere recital of 
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came the purpose and primary effect prongs of the Lemon test.23 
In Walz, a realty owner sought an injunction preventing the 
New York City Tax Commission from granting property tax ex-
emptions for facilities used solely for religious purposes.24 The. 
state constitutional provision211 allowing for the deduction was 
found not to establish, sponsor or support religion.26 The Court 
called for close scrutiny of the degree of governmental involve-
ment in religious activities and institutions.27 The Walz court's 
focus on governmental involvement was adopted in Lemon as 
the "entanglement" prong.28 
After discussing Walz and Allen, the Court turned its atten-
tion to the statutes at issue by focusing on the entanglement 
prong.29 Rhode Island's authority to examine school records to 
determine the amount of secular-related expense was held to be 
"fraught with the sort of entanglement that the constitution for-
bids. "30 The similar power granted by the Pennsylvania statute 
. was found to "create[] an intimate and continuing relationship 
between church and state."31 Accordingly, both Acts were held 
unconstitutional. 32 
23. Lemon 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Allen, 392 U.S. at 243). 
24. 397 U.S. at 666. Walz argued that the property tax exemption forced him to 
indirectly support religious institutions in violation of the First Amendment. The opin-
ion does not elaborate, but this support presumably came in the form of the religious 
organizations' receipt of tax-funded municipal services. 
25. N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1. 
26. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-74. The court found that the New York statute did not 
favor any single faith, and furthered the state's interest in the "moral or mental im-
provement" of its citizens. 
27. Id. at 674. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the court, recognized that some gov-
ernmental involvement with religion is inevitable, i.e. taxation and exemption. The di-
viding line is crossed when this involvement becomes "excessive." Unfortunately, little 
guidance is offered as to the parameters of excessiveness, which may account for some of 
the resulting confusion when the term was incorporated into later decisions. 
28. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). 
29. Id. at 620. 
30. Id. at 621. The Court, as it had in Allen, accepted the legislature's stated pur-
pose on face value in the absence of evidence contradictory to that purpose. In Allen, 
however, a secular purpose was found because nothing about its effects appeared non-
secular. Had the same reasoning been applied in Lemon, the opposite may have resulted: 
Nearly all of the aid bestowed by both programs was received by Roman Catholic paro-
chial schools. Had the Lemon court chosen to assess purpose through effect, both pro-
grams may have failed the purpose prong. However, the Court's discussion of effect in 
Lemon was subsumed under the entanglement prong. 
31. Id. at 622. 
32. Id. at 625. 
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On its face, the Lemon test represented the clearest state-
ment thus far of Establishment Clause doctrine.33 Chief Justice 
Burger, however, offered a disclaimer to any notion that Estab-
lishment Clause "confusion" was ending: "Judicial caveats 
against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, 
far from being a 'wall', is a blurred, indistinct and variable bar-
rier depending on all the circumstances of a particular 
relationship. "3. 
III. EDWARDS V. AQUILLARD 
The Court made fullest use to date of Lemon's purpose 
prong in 1987 in Edwards v. Aguillard,3r. assessing the constitu-
tionality of a Louisiana statute.86 Edwards provides strong sup-
port for eliminating Lemon's purpose prong. Louisiana's "Bal-
anced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science 
Act"87 does not mandate the teaching of either creationism or 
evolutionary theory.88 If one theory is taught, however, the other 
must be given equal treatment in the curriculum.89 
33. Lemon represents the first attempt to synthesize earlier doctrine, but as will be 
shown, infra, this synthesis misstates the basis of the doctrine. 
34. [d. at 614. 
35. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987). 
36. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1-17:286.7 (West 1982). 
37. [d. 
38. [d. § 286.5 of the Act provides: 
This Subpart does not require any instruction in the subject 
of origins but simply permits instruction in both scientific 
models (of evolution-science and creation-science) if public 
schools choose'to teach either. This Subpart does not require 
each individual textbook or library book to give balanced 
treatment to the models of evolution-science and creation-sci-
ence; it does not require any school books to be discarded. 
This Subpart does not require each individual classroom lec-
ture in a course to give such balanced treatment but simply 
permits the lectures as a whole to give balanced treatment; it 
permits some lectures to present evolution-science and other 
lectures to present creation-science. 
39. [d. § 286.4(A) "Authorization for balanced treatment": 
Commencing with the 1982-1983 school year, public schools 
within this state shall give balanced treatment to creation-sci-
ence and to evolution-science. Balanced treatment of these 
two models shall be given in classroom lectures taken as a 
whole for each course, in library materials taken as a whole for 
the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities, and in 
other educational programs in public schools, to the extent 
5
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Plaintiffs were parents of school children, teachers, and reli-
gious leaders.·o All sought to enjoin implementation of the act as 
a violation of the First Amendment.41 The District Court 
granted summary judgment for plaintiffs.·2 
The court of appeals rejected defendants' argument that the 
legislature's expressed secular purpose was controlling.·s Defend-
ants' petition for rehearing was denied.·· 
Justice Brennan found the act unconstitutional on its face,4& 
"[P]etitioners have identified no clear secular purpose for the 
Louisiana Act.,,·e The stated "purpose" of promoting academic 
that such lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational 
programs deal in any way with the subject of the origin of 
man, life, the earth, or the universe. When creation or evolu-
tion is taught, each shall be taught as a theory, rather than as 
proven scientific fact. 
40. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2576. Among the plaintiffs were the Louisiana Board of 
Elementary and Secondary Eduacation, and the Orleans Parish School Board, originally 
defendants, but later realigned in opposition to the Act. Id., note 1. 
41. Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426 (La. 1985). Plaintiffs argued that no mate-
rial issue of fact existed, and that the Act violated the Establishment Clause as a matter 
of law. Id. at 427. 
42. Id. The court rejected defendants' argument that a material issue existed over 
the definition of "science": 
We decline the invitation to judge that debate. Whatever "sci-
ence" may be, "creation," as the term is used in the statute, 
involves religion, and the teaching of "creation-science" and 
"creationism," as contemplated by the statute, involves teach-
ing "tailored to the principles" of a particular religious sect or 
group of sects. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106, 89 S. 
Ct. 266, 271, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). As it is ordinarily under-
stood, the term "creation" means the bringing into existence 
of mankind and of the universe and implies a divine creator. 
Id. at 427-428. . 
43. Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985). The court found that 
the Act: 
Id. 
[a)lthough purporting to promote academic freedom, the Act 
does not and cannot, in reality, serve that purpose ... it re-
quires, presumably upon risk of sanction or dismissal for fail-
ure to comply, the teaching of creation-science whenever 
evolution is taught .... [T)he compulsion inherent in the Bal-
anced Treatment Act is, on its face, inconsistent with the idea 
of academic freedom as it is universally understood. 
44. 778 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1985). 
45. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2575. 
46. Id. at 2578. (emphasis added). By this, the court obviously meant that petition-
ers were unable to show that the stated purpose of the Act is "clearly" genuine. The 
stated purpose is clear: to promote academic freedom. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 
6
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freedom was inconsistent with the Act's primary effect of pro-
moting a. particular religious belief.47 Provisions of the Act pro-
tected teachers who were "creation scientists" and provided re-
search services to them, without making similar provisions for 
those espousing evolutionary theory.48 This effectively gave "cre-
ation-science" curriculum a practical advantage.49 The Court 
then looked to the legislative history in order to probe beyond 
the stated secular purpose:~o The belief that humankind was cre-
ated by a supernatural being was found to be a central tenet of 
those responsible for the bill.lil The legislative intent, therefore, 
(West 1982). Unfortunately for the sponsors, a "paper trail" was left in the legislative 
history which pointed to their religious motives. It is doubtful that such carelessness will 
occur in the future. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
47. Edwards, 107 S.Ct. at 2582. The Court once again examined "purpose" through 
"effect", an indirect way of getting at the true issue: purpose. If the effects of an act 
indicate an unconstitutional purpose, then the effects are likely to be unconstitutional in 
themselves. 
48. § 286.4(C) protected teachers of creation-science: 
No teacher in public elementary or secondary school or in-
structor in any state supported university in Louisiana, who 
chooses to be a creation-scientist or to teach scientific data 
which points to creationism shall, for that reason, be discrimi-
nated in any way by any school board, college board or 
administrator. 
No parallel safeguards were provided to teachers espousing evolution-science. Further, § 
286.7(A) of the Act provided that "Each city and parish school board shall develop and 
provide to each public classroom teacher in the system a curriculum guide on presenta-
tion of creation-science." Thus, the act required assistance and guidance in creation-
science instruction while giving no aid to evolution-science. Finally, § 286.7(B) provided: 
The governor shall designate seven creation-scientists who 
shall provide resource services in the development of curricu-
lum guides to any city or parish school board upon request. 
Each such creation-scientist shall be designated from among 
the full-time faculty members in any college and university in 
Louisiana. These creation-scientists shall serve at the pleasure 
of the governor and without compensation. 
No such panel was mandated to develop evolutionary curriculum guides. 
49. The Court agreed "with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act does not 
serve to protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly different purpose of discredit-
ing 'evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of crea-
tion science ... .''' Edwards, 107 S.Ct. at 2580. 
50. [d. at 2581. The majority made a thorough examination of the debate and testi-
mony surrounding passage of the bill. This represents the best possible method for truly 
determining an acts "purpose" and yet, as the dissent points out, infra at notes 56-58, 
this method is unreliable. 
51. The Court noted: 
The sponsor of the Creationism Act, Senator Keith, explained 
during the legislative hearings that his disdain for the theory 
of evolution resulted from the support that evolution supplied 
to views contrary to his own religious beliefs. According to 
7
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"was to restructure the science curriculum to conform to a par-
ticular religious viewpoint. "1i2 
Justice Powell, joined by Justice O'Connor, filed a concur-
ring opinion also finding the legislative history had refuted the 
Act's stated secular purpose. liS "The tenets of creation-science 
parallel the Genesis story of creation, and this is a religious 
belief. "1i4 
Justice White concurred separately on the basis that the 
lower court's interpretation should be given deference in the ab-
sence of any indication of error.1iIi 
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
attacked the majority's application of the purpose prong of 
Lemon, as well as the viability of the prong itself.1i6 Finding that 
some indication of religious purpose is permissible, Scalia as-
serted "[t]he majority's invalidation of the Balanced Treatment 
Act is defensible only if the record indicates that the Louisiana 
Legislature had no secular purpose. "117 
[d. at 2582. 
52. [d. 
Senator Keith, the theory of evolution was consonant with the 
'cardinal principle[s] of religious humanism, secular human-
ism, theological liberalism, aetheistism [sic].' 
53. The key witness testifying in support of the Act, Dr. Edward Bourdeaux, noted 
that recognized creation-scientists were "affiliated with either or both the Institute for 
Creation Research and the Creation Research Society." 107 S. Ct. at 2587. The Court 
discovered that the former was founded "to address the 'urgent need for our nation to 
return to belief in a personal, omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose for His creation 
and to whom all people must eventually give account.''' [d. Members of the Creation 
Research Society had to "subscribe to the following statement of belief: 'The Bible is the 
written word of God, and because it is inspired throughout, all of its assertions are his-
torically and scientifically true.' " [d. 
54. [d. at 2588. 
. 55. Justice White found that "both courts construed the statutory words 'creation 
science' to refer to a religious belief," and noted that the Court normally accepts a ra-
tional construction of a state statute by a court of appeals. [d. at 2590-91. 
56. [d. at 2593. 
57. [d. at 2594. [emphasis in original.] Justice Scalia's opinion further serves to il-
lustrate the ineffectiveness of the purpose prong as an analytical device: "Our cases have 
also confirmed that when the Lemon court referred to 'a secular ... purpose,'it meant 'a 
secular purpose'." [d. af2593. [emphasis in original.] This implies that secular purpose is 
a lPinimum standard, one easily met. It is not a great leap, conceptually, from a secular 
purpose to any secular purpose. By this reasoning, courts are invited to search the outer 
reaches of possible legislative motives, and an act passed almost entirely for religious 
purposes would still be constitutional if some hint of secular purpose were imaginable. 
8
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The dissent concluded by calling into question the efficacy 
of relying upon legislative histories which "are eminently manip-
ulable. Legislative histories can be contrived and sanitized, 
favorable media coverage orchestrated, and post enactment 
recollections conveniently distorted. "118 
Although it makes the fullestll9 use of the purpose prong to 
date, Edwards would have been more correctlyG° decided under 
an effects analysis.s1 The Court's detailed investigation into leg-
islative history could have been sidestepped by focussing first on 
effects, a better choice given the pitfalls of determining legisla-
tive intent. The effect of Edwards on the Lemon test may be to 
invite fuller use of the purpose prong. This is unfortunate, as the 
purpose prong adds nothing to Establishment Clause analysis 
and "is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results".s2 
IV. THE PURPOSE PRONG'S SHAKY FOUNDATION 
As noted by Justice Scalia, the purpose prong of Lemon has 
received cursory treatment by the Court since its inception.ss 
This highlights the prong's limited utility, and suggests that it 
may indeed add little to Establishment Clause analysis.s4 
The purpose prong is more apparent than real.SII This be-
58. [d. at 2606. According to the dissent, legislative histories, inadequate as they are, 
are the only means available for the purpose. Beyond this, "discerning the subjective 
motivation of' those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible 
task." [d. at 2605. Justice Scalia would place purpose prong analysis in the realm of 
guesswork. 
59. Edwards represents the most detailed discussion and analysis by the Court of 
Lemon's purpose prong, and demonstrates the lengths to which the Court can and will 
go to ascertain the purpose behind an act. This repudiates the Court's prior practice of 
summary treatment of purpose prong issues, noted in Justice Scalia's dissent, "typically 
devoting no more than a sentence or two to the matter." [d. at 2593. 
60. The result in Edwards may be correct, but it is best defended in light of what 
the Balanced Treatment Act would have achieved: an academic environment favorable 
to creationism while hostile to other theories. 
61. The practical advantages and protections (discussed supra note 48) which the 
Act gave to creationism had the effect of advancing this religious doctrine. No further 
analysis is necessary to find a violation of the establishment clause. 
62. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S" 38, 112 (1985)(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
63. Edwards 107 S. Ct. at 2593. See supra note 57. 
64. [d. at 2605. 
65. Purpose prong analysis is almost always, theoretically and practically, an indi-
9
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. comes clear upon examining the confusing authority upon which 
it is based. In its first enunciation of the test,66 the Lemon Court 
cites Board of Education v. Allen, supra, as authority for the 
purpose and primary effect prongs. In Allen, secular purpose is 
fpund to exist because, "[a]ppellants have shown us nothing 
about the necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to its 
stated purpose."67 The secular purpose analysis in Allen focuses 
almost exclusively on the effects of the act in question.6s Thus, 
the purpose prong was without a clearly defined criteria at its 
inception. 
Allen, in turn, relied upon Abington Township School Dis-
trict v. Schempp,6e the earliest express statement of an Estab-
lishment Clause test: "The test may be stated as follows: what 
are the ,purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If ei-
ther is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enact-
ment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by 
the constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures 
of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative 
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion. II7O Abington involved two cases challenging statutorily 
mandated Bible readings at the beginning of the school day in 
Pennsylvanian and Maryland72 public schools. The Court sum-
marily disposed of the acts' purposes by noting their effect: "But 
even if [the state's] purpose is not strictly religious, it is sought 
to be accomplished through readings, without comment, from 
the Bible. "78 These readings are the effects of the statutes as 
implemented, and not the purpose underlying their enactment. 
The Abington test, supra, cited two earlier opinions, Ever-
son v. Board of Education7• and McGowan v. Maryland.'" Ever-
son involved a New Jersey statute which provided for reim-
reet method of assessing an Act's primary effects. 
66. 403 U.S. at 613. 
67. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243. 
68. Id. at 244. 
69. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
'(0. Id. at 222. 
71. 24 PA. STAT. § 15-1516 (Supp. 1960). 
72. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77 § 202 (1957). 
73. Abbington, 374 U.S. at 224. 
74. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
75. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
10
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bursement to parents for the costs of sending their children to 
school on public transportation.78 Some of these children at-
tended Catholic parochial schools.77 The Court's focus was ex-
clusively on effect: "The 'establishment of religion 'clause means 
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set 
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force 
nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church 
against his will or force him to profess a belief in any religion. "78 
There is no concern with the purpose behind any of these imper-
missible results. The Court examined the effect of the statute 
and found that paying for busing properly furthered the educa-
tional program of New Jersey, and the incidental effect of aiding 
parochial students did not violate the Establishment Clause.79 
Cited to support the "purpose and primary effect" test in Abing-
ton,80 Everson is actually only authority for the effect prong. In 
reality, the purpose prong was spontaneously created in 
Abington. 
In McGowan, Maryland's Sunday Closing Laws81 were chal-
lenged.82 The Court cited Everson for its "purpose and effect" 
test;83 Everson and McGowan were later cited in Abington.84 
Recognizing the religious purpose behind the Act's anteced-
ents,BII the Court held that the present effect of creating a uni-
form day of rest for Maryland's citizens rendered it permissible 
under the Establishment Clause.88 
. Language in McGowan indicates a blurring between the 
purpose and effect inquiries which was to recur in subsequent 
debate. "[Elvidence of religious purpose . .. may be gleaned 
from the face of the present statute and from its. operative 
76. N.J. REV. STAT. § 18:14-8 (1941). 
77. ElJerson, 330 U.S. at 3. 
78. [d. at 15. 
79. [d. at 17. 
80. 374 U.S. at 222. 
81. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 521 (1957). 
82. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 422. Defendants had been indicted for selling a loose-leaf 
binder, a can of floor wax, a stapler and staples and a toy submarine, on Sunday. 
83. [d. at 443. 
84. [d. at 443-45. 
85. [d. at 446. 
86. 366 U.S. at 449. 
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effect."87 
The opinions from which the Lemon test was derived fo-
cused their primary attention on the effects of challenged acts. 
When purpose was discussed, it was given minimal treatment 
and usually tested by analyzing an act's effects. Such problems 
are characteristic of later applications of Lemon's purpose 
prong. This may indicate that such difficulties are inherent to 
this type of inquiry. 
The purpose prong's ineffectiveness is further highlighted 
by asking what evils it might realistically be expected to pre-
. vent. It is difficult to imagine a legislative body, possessing im-
permissibly religious motives, enacting a law with a patently re-
ligious preamble and no impermissible effect. As absurd as such 
a scenario seems, it may be one of the few instances where the 
purpose prong would have real utility. 
V. THE RESULTING CONFUSION 
Although it is generally included as an element of the test 
whenever Lemon is cited, the purpose prong is rarely invoked to 
dispose of an issue. A reading of forty88 state c~urt opinions cit-
87. Id. at 445 (emphasis added). 
88. Cortez v. Independence Co., 287 Ark. 279, 698 S.W.2d 291 (1985), Walker v. 
Superior Ct., 47 Cal. 3d 112, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), Wollersheim v. Church of 
Scientology of Cal., 212 Cal. App. 3d 872, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1989), Okrand v. City of 
Los Angeles, 207 Cal. App. 3d 566, 254 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1989), Jimmy Swaggert Ministries 
v. Board of Equalization of State of Cal., 204 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 250 Cal. Rptr. 891 
(1988), Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 243 Cal. 
Rptr. 545 (1988), Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 194 Cal. App. 3d 
1147, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987), Bennett v. Livermore Unified School Dist., 193 Cal. App. 
3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987), Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Philibosian, 
157 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1984), Conrad v. City and County of Denver, 
656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982), Young Life v. Division of Employment and Training, 650 P.2d 
515 (Colo. 1982), McDonnell v. Episcopal Diocese of Ga., 191 Ga. App. 174, 381 S.E.2d 
126 (1989), Koolau Baptist Church v. Department of Labor and Indus. Relations, 68 
Haw. 410, 718 P.2d 267 (1986), Gregersen v. Blume, 113 Idaho 220, 743 P.2d 88 (1987), 
Pre-School Owners Ass'n of Ill. v. Department of Children and Family Serv., 119 Ill. 2d 
268, 518 N.E.2d 1018 (1988), In re Marriage of Tisckos, 161 Ill. App. 3d 302, 514 N.E.2d 
523 (1987), Zucco v. Garrett, 150 Ill. App. 3d 146, 501 N.E.2d 373 (1986), Heckman v. 
Cemeteries Ass'n of Greater Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 3d 451, 468 N.E.2d 1354 (1984), Terp-
stra v. State, 529 N.E.2d 839 (Ind. App. 1988), Farris v. Minit Mart Foods, Inc. No. 37, 
684 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1984), Baltimore Lutheran High School Ass'n, Inc. v. Employment 
Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 490 A.2d 701 (1985), Taunton Eastern Little League v. City of 
12
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ing Lemon yields seventeen89 which separately discuss purpose. 
Within this group, secular purpose analysis is unnecessary to.the 
resolution of the Establishment Clause issues in question, and 
produces confusing and inconsistent results. A few examples will 
illustrate this. 
A common problem in purpose prong analysis is resorting to 
an examination of effects in order to test the constitutionality of 
purpose. In Heckman v. Cemeteries Ass'n of Chicago,90 ceme-
tery union members challenged a statute91 allowing certain buri-
als on Sunday and legal holidays. A secular. purpose was found 
Taunton, 389 Mass. 719, 452 N.E.2d 211 (1983), Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Depart-
ment of Educ., 426 Mich. 462, 396 N.W.2d 373 (1986), McLeod v. Providence Christian 
School, 160 Mich. 333, 408 N.W. 146 (1987), Matter of Minneapolis Community Dev. 
Agency, 439 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 1989), State v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1988), 
Pruey v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control of N.M., 104 N.M. 10, 715 P.2d 458 
(1986), Board of Educ. of MonroeWoodbury Cent. School Dist. v. Wieder, 132 A.D. 2d 
409,522 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y.App.Div. 1987), Smith v. Community Bd. No.14, 128 Misc.2d 
944,491 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), Kay by Disselbrett v. David Douglas School 
Dist. No. 40, 79 Or. App. 384, 719 P.2d 875 (1986), Salem College and Academy, Inc. v. 
Employment Div., 61 Or. App. 616, 659 P.2d 415 (1983), Bishop Carroll High School v. 
Commonwealth, Unemployment Bd. of Review, 557 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), 
Pennsylvania State Univ. v. Commonwealth, Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 95 Pa. 
Commw. 388, 505 A.2d 1053 (1986), Covenant Community Church v. Lowe, 698 S.W.2d 
339 (Tenn. 1985), State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 
1984), Bullock v. Texas Monthly, Inc., 731 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), Witters v. 
State Comm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989), State ex. reI. 
Boyles v. Whatcom County Superior Court, 103 Wash. 2d 610, 694 P.2d 27 (1985), Wit-
ters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984), Bill of Rights 
Legal Foundation v. Evergreen State College, 44 Wash. App. 690, 723 P.2d 483 (1986). 
89. Cortez v. Independence Co., 287 Ark. 279, 698 S.W.2d 291 (1985) Walker v. Su-
perior Ct., 47 Cal. 3d 112, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified 
School Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 243 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1988), Bennett v. Livermore Uni-
fied School Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987), Feminist Women's 
Health Center, Inc. v. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1984), 
Conrad v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982), Young Life v. Division 
of Employment and Training, 650 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1982), Pre-S.chool Owners Ass'n of Ill. 
v. Department of Children and Family Serv., 119 Ill. 2d 268, 518 N.E.2d 1018 (1988), 
Zucco v. Garrett, 150 Ill. App. 3d 146, 501 N.E.2d 373 (1986), Heckman v. Cemeteries 
Ass'n of Greater Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 3d 451, 468 N.E.2d 1354 (1984), Taunton Eastern 
Little League v. City of Taunton, 389 Mass. 719, 452 N.E.2d 211 (1983), Pruey v. Depart-
ment of Alcoholic Beverage Control of N.M., 104 N.M. 10, 715 P.2d 458 (1986), Smith v. 
Community Bd. No.14, 128 Misc.2d 944, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), Kay by 
Disselbrett v. David Douglas School Dist. No. 40, 79 Or. App. 384, 719 P.2d 875 (1986), 
Covenant Community Church v. Lowe, 698 S.W.2d 339 (Tenn. 1985), State v. Corpus 
Christi People's Baptist Church, 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1984), Bullock v. Texas Monthly, 
Inc., 731 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
90. 127 Ill. App. 3d 451, 468 N.E. 2d 1354 (1984). 
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 21 para. 101 (1983). 
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by examining the act's effect: The Act in question has a valid 
secular purpose. The record indicates that certain religious 
groups were required to conduct burials on Sundays or holidays 
because of their religious beliefs and could not always act in ac-
cordance with their beliefs because under certain labor agree-
ments, cemetery workers did not have to perform interments on 
those days. The act eliminated the discriminatory effect of the 
agreements.92 The act clearly had the secular effect of remedying 
discriminatory work schedules,' but it does not follow that this 
evidences a properly secular purpose behind the act. 
In Bullock v. Texas Monthly98 a magazine publisher sought 
to invalidate a provision of the Texas Tax Code94 which ex-
empted religious publications from payment of sales tax. The 
Court of Appeals found the act's secular purpose to be evi-
denced because it "restricts the fiscal relationship between 
church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the 
desired separation insulating each from the other." (emphasis 
in original).911 The inquiry here is on the effect of the Tax Code 
section, not on its purpose. It is not clear that a piece of fiscal 
legislation such as this would be enacted in order to maintain 
church-state separation. 
Essentially, these cases reason that an act which has per-
missible effects must have been conceived for a permissible pur-
pose. This overlooks the second prong of Lemon which expressly 
examines effect. 
Another problem courts have with Lemon's purpose analysis 
stems from the lack of a clearly defined, judicially manageable 
test for secular or religious purpose. This led one court to specu-
late as to governmental motives. In Pre-School Owners Ass'n v. 
Department of Children and Family Services," the Illinois Su-
. preme Court examined a statutory provision97 which exempted 
religiously affiliated day-care centers from its licensing require-
ments. Applying Lemon's purpose prong the Court found that 
92. 468 N.E. 2d at 1358. 
93. 731 S.W. 2d 160 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd. 109 S.Ct. 890. 
94. TEx. TAX CODE § 151.312 (Supp. 1987). 
95. 731 S.W. 2d at 163 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 676). 
96. 119 Ill. 2d 268, 518 N.E. 2d 1018 (1988). 
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23 par 2212.09(i)(1985). 
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"[T]he legislature could have properly found that the need for 
regulation by the department was more urgent in some areas 
than in others and therefore could have determined to concen-
trate the Departments's resources on those programs where the 
perceived need was greater.98 Had the actual purpose behind the 
act been impermissible under Lemon, this fact would nonethe-
less have been obscured by the court's willingness to supply a 
permissible one. Such speculation obviates any attempt at 
meaningful purpose prong inquiry. 
Other courts have been equally creative in analyzing an 
act's purpose. Smith v. Community Bd. No. 1499 involved a chal-
lenge to a community board's approval of the construction of an 
eruvlOO around a portion of New York City. The Court, looking 
for a secular purpose, went beyond the eruv's function as an aid 
to observing the Jewish Sabbath. "The requirement of a secular 
purpose has been satisfied inasmuch as the eruv committee 
raised sea fences which had fallen into disrepair over the years. 
These sea fences had originally been built to prevent flooding, 
erosion and windblown sand from going onto the streets and 
neighboring property. mOl Although a portion of the eruv in 
question was the sea fence, it is unlikely that the eruv commit-
tee's reason for repairing it was for any purpose other than the 
maintenance of a religious structure. 
Perhaps the simplest way for courts to dispose of purpose 
prong inquiry is to merely acknowledge a legislative statement of 
properly secular purpose: "The secular purpose requirement has 
become a largely perfunctory inquiry easily satisfied by any leg-
islative recitation of purpose. . . . We need only look to the 
quoted statement of purpose found in RCW 74.16.181 to hold 
that this statute has a valid secular legislative purpose.IIl02 
98. 119 Ill. 2d at 275, 518 N.E. 2d at 1024 (emphasis added). 
99. ~91 N.Y.S. 2d 584, 128 Misc.2d 944 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). 
100. An eruv, under Jewish law, is an unbroken physical boundary of an area of land 
owned by the public and open to the public 24 hours a day. It allows a Jewish person 
observing the Sabbath to move objects from his private residence onto public property 
and back. Such activities would ordinarily be prohibited during the Sabbath. [d. at 585. 
101. [d. at 587. 
102. Witters v. State Comm'n For the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 
624, 689 P.2d 53,56 (1984) rev'd 474 U.S. 481. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The line drawn between church and state will remain peren-
nially flexible, given the inherent tension between the two reli-
gion clauses of the First Amendment. Because this line must be 
continually redrawn, a workable judicial standard is essential to 
developing a coherent Constitutional framework in this area. 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test undermines this frame-
work by importing an element of subjectivity into an especially 
vulnerable area of the law. The result is a line of decisions which 
offer little lasting guidance and are difficult to reconcile. Elimi-
nating the purpose prong will allow the debate to focus on the 
principle concerns of the Establishment Clause: Has government 
excessively advanced, repelled or involved itself in religion? 
Michael Barnes* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1991. 
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